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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAWN DAVID LARSON, 
Defendant. 
CASENO.20060874-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant, SHAWN DAVID LARSON ("Mr. Larson"), appeals from the 
denial of his motion to dismiss pursuant to 120-day disposition and the Sentence, 
Judgment, and Order for Commitment. This Court has appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss 
the charges pursuant to the speedy trial statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1 (now 
repealed)? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's denial of Mr. Larson's 
motion to dismiss is reviewed for abuse of discretion, its factual conclusions for 
clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d 
184, 186 (Utah App. 2003); State v. Mahi, 125 P.3d 103, 105 (Utah App. 2005). 
"An appellate court will find abuse of discretion only where there is no reasonable 
basis in the record to support the trial court's speedy trial statute determination of 
good cause.9' State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d at 186. 
ISSUE 2: Was Mr. Larson denied his constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not diligently pursue timely 
bringing the case to trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, this Court resolves the issue as a 
matter of law. State v. Mahi, 125 P.3d 103, 105 (Utah App. 2005). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Larson was charged with eleven counts of 
Aggravated Robbery with gang enhancements, each a first degree felony, and one 
second degree felony count of Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm 
by a Restricted Person. Rl-6. At the time, Mr. Larson was serving a commitment 
at the Utah State Prison on another case for which he was released on January 13, 
2004. R416:102. 
A Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges dated April 18, 
2003 was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003. R21-3 (Addendum A); 
R416:55. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for June 10, 2003 (R19-20), at 
which time counsel for both parties stipulated to a continuance. R24-5. 
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Counsel subsequently stipulated twice more to a continuance of the 
preliminary hearing because the prosecutor anticipated the federal government 
would file charges against Mr. Larson for the offenses in this case. R26-9. The 
preliminary hearing was scheduled for both August 27, 2003 and on the "backup 
date of October 8, 2003. R409:2-3. On August 27, 2003, Mr. Larson was 
transported from the prison, but his counsel failed to appear and was consequently 
held in contempt. R30-31, 35-9 (Addendum B). Over Mr. Larson's objections, 
the court found that because defense counsel had failed to appear, defense counsel 
had waived Mr. Larson's right to a speedy trial. R31-3. 
The preliminary hearing was finally conducted and all of the charges were 
bound over on October 8, 2003, although the court found insufficient evidence to 
bind over the gang enhancements. R42-5. The State subsequently filed an 
amended information adding an additional first degree felony charge for 
Aggravated Robbery. R51-5. Mr. Larson pleaded "not guilty" to the charges on 
October 20, 2003, and a jury trial was scheduled for November 18-20, 2003. R48-
50. Defense counsel filed a motion and stipulation for a continuance of the jury 
trial on November 7, 2003, so the defense could retain a DNA expert. R56. At a 
pretrial conference on November 10, 2003, the trial was rescheduled to March 24-
6,2004. R59-61. 
On February 10, 2004, defense counsel filed a Motion and Stipulation for 
Continuance of the jury trial on the ground that the defense's DNA expert needed 
3 
more time to evaluate the DNA evidence. R97. On February 20, 2004 jthe jury 
trial was rescheduled to June 8-10, 2004. R105-07. 
At a pretrial conference conducted on May 24, 2004, the trial court 
informed Mr. Larson that he had already waived his request for 120-day 
disposition, at which time Mr. Larson indicated he wanted to fire his counsel and 
requested 60 days to retain another attorney. R129-130. On June 28, 2004, the 
matter was referred back to Salt Lake Legal Defenders for the appointment of new 
counsel. Rl35-36. 
On July 14, 2004, James Valdez entered an appearance as counsel for Mr. 
Larson and the matter was set for a hearing on Mr. Larson's motion for 120-day 
disposition on August 4, 2004. R147-50. Mr. Larson subsequently filed a Motion 
to Dismiss Pursuant to Defendant's Demand for Disposition Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 77-29-5. R158-9, 161-4, 230-36 (Addendum C). The trial court 
denied Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss on August 13, 2004 and entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Court Order on September 29, 2004. 
R224-6; R238-42 (Addendum D). Mr. Larson's counsel then filed a motion to 
continue the trial to allow him time to prepare for DNA evidence, to which motion 
the State objected. R228-9. 
At the pretrial conference on November 29, 2004, Mr. Larson fired Mr. 
Valdez and the trial date was stricken so Mr. Larson's as yet unretained counsel 
could have time to review the case. R257-8. The State filed an Objection to 
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Further Appointment of Counsel. R276-91. On December 13, 2004, Mr. Larson 
requested additional time for his family to retain private counsel. R292-3. 
On January 3, 2005, Mr. Larsen filed a pro se "Motion to Appeal Judge 
Barratt's Decision of Ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Pursuant to 
120 Day Disposition Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1," stating that he was seeking "to 
have the [] case appealed in the Utah Supreme Court, State of Utah . . . " R302-10 
(Addendum E). The minute entry from a hearing on January 3, 2005 indicates 
that the trial court "addressed the appeal filed by [Mr. Larson], stating no appeal 
could be addressed until there was a trial." R321. 
On January 18, 2005, attorney D. Christopher VanCampen entered an 
appearance on behalf of Mr. Larson. R324. The minute entry from a hearing 
conducted on January 24, 2005 indicates that Mr. Larson waived his right to a 
speedy trial. R328-9. On February 14, 2005, the State dismissed Counts 4-13 and 
Mr. Larson pled guilty to three counts of Aggravated Robbery pursuant to State v. 
Sery1 so he could "pursu[e] his rights to appeal." R340 (336-45) (Addendum F). 
Mr. Larson was sentenced to prison six years to life on April 4, 2005 on 
each count, consecutive. R345-6. However, Mr. VanCampen never filed a Notice 
of Appeal. Thus, on November 8, 2005, Mr. Larson filed, pro se, a Motion for 
Reinstatement of Direct Appeal; Motion for Appointment of Counsel, wherein he 
758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
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requested reinstatement of his right to direct appeal pursuant to State v. Manning 
and formally requested a hearing. R349-52, 356 (Addendum G). In its Minute 
Entry and Order denying Mr. Larson's motion dated March 23, 2006, the trial 
court noted that Mr. Larson's pro se motion had an incorrect caption and a copy 
was not provided to the district attorney. R359-61 (Addendum H). 
The court further stated that Mr. Larson did not file a Notice of Appeal and thus 
his motions were not timely. Id. 
On April 18, 2006, Mr. Larson filed, pro se, a Notice of Appeal. R363-4. 
Mr. Larson again requested assistance and the appointment of counsel in a letter 
received by the trial court on April 25, 2006. R369. The Utah Supreme Court 
transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals on May 4, 2006. R370. This 
Court temporarily remanded the matter to the Third District Court on May 11, 
2006, for the appointment of counsel. R373. The Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association was appointed to represent Mr. Larson on June 8, 2006 (R379), and 
the court entered a Finding of Indigency and Order of Appointment of Counsel on 
July 13, 2006. R388-90. Current counsel was subsequently appointed. 
This matter previously came before this Court and, pursuant to the 
stipulation of the parties, was remanded back to the district court for a hearing 
pursuant to State v. Manning, supra. The parties subsequently stipulated that Mr. 
Larson's arraignment counsel was ineffective and further stipulated that his right 
to appeal should be reinstated. The district court signed an Order reinstating Mr. 
2
 2005 UT 61, 122P.3d628. 
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Larson's right to appeal on October 16, 2007, and Mr. Larson timely filed a Notice 
of Appeal on October 23, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Larson was charged with several first degree 
felonies for Aggravated Robbery, and one second degree felony count of 
Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted Person. Rl-6. 
A Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges dated April 18, 2003, 
was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003 and filed with the trial court on May 
16,2003. R21-3 (Addendum A); R416:55. September 3, 2003, was 120 calendar 
days after the filing of the request. R416:98, 101. At the time he was charged, 
Mr. Larson was serving a commitment at the Utah State Prison on another case for 
which he was released on January 13,2004. R416:102. 
A preliminary hearing was schedule for June 10, 2003 (R19-20), at which 
time counsel for the State explained that because she had 13-14 witnesses 
(R409:l3), both parties stipulated to continue the matter to a special setting. R24-
5. The trial court offered to schedule the hearing in two weeks but the State was 
unavailable. R409:2. The hearing was continued to July 3, 2003. Id. The State 
did not notify the trial court of Mr. Larson's request for 120-day disposition. 
3
 R409 contains multiple transcripts from several hearings and thus there are 
duplicate page numbers. Accordingly, the page number in the citation refers to 
the transcript from the date indicated. 
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On July 14, 2003, counsel again stipulated to a continuance of the 
preliminary hearing to determine if the federal government would file charges 
against Larson for the offenses in this case, in which case the State case was to be 
dismissed, and the court scheduled the matter for a status conference on July 28, 
2003. R26-7; R409:l. Again, the State made no mention of Mr. Larson's request 
for 120-day disposition. 
On July 28, 2003, counsel for Mr. Larson indicated that there was still no 
word about whether the federal government was going to indict Mr. Larson and 
requested a preliminary hearing. R409:l. The court scheduled the hearing for 
both August 27 and October 8, 2003 as a ''backup." R409:2-3. Again, the State 
said nothing about Mr. Larson's request for 120-day disposition, which would 
expire before the October 8 backup date. 
At the preliminary hearing scheduled on August 27, 2003, Mr. Larson was 
transported from the prison but his counsel made a scheduling error and appeared 
late. R30-31, 35-9: R410:6. Fifteen minutes after the hearing was to have started, 
the trial court imposed costs against the Salt Lake Legal Defenders for the 
witnesses, the court reporter, and transportation costs. R410:5-6. At the State's 
request, the court kept the matter scheduled on the backup date of October 8, 
2003, and found that because defense counsel had failed to appear, defense 
counsel had waived Mr. Larson's right to a speedy trial. R31-3; R410:6-7.4 
4
 Defense counsel, Mr. O'Connell appeared about 30 minutes late. R416:91. 
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In response to the court's finding of waiver, Mr. Larson asked, "How can I 
be held to account for another person when I have no power over him?" The court 
responded: 
It's a good question. Other than to say because you could go to prison for 
the rest of your life, I'll just - if you need an attorney, we wouldn't 
presume to try to get you to go to court without one. For purposes of this 
segment of time I'm not holding failure for you to have a speedy trial 
against the State. It doesn't count against them. 
R410:7. Again, there was no mention at this time of the fact that Mr. Larson had 
filed a request for 120-day disposition almost 120 days previously. In its written 
Order of Contempt, the trial court found that Mr. Larson's attorney had "impeded 
the administration of justice [and] . . . his client's right to a speedy trial..." (R37; 
Addendum B). 
The preliminary hearing was conducted and all the charges were bound 
over on October 8, 2003, more than 120 days after Mr. Larson filed his request for 
120-day disposition. R42-5. Ten witnesses, who were also victims, testified about 
the robbery that occurred at the Crown Burger restaurant on April 2, 2002. R411. 
None of the witnesses identified Mr. Larson as the perpetrator. R411:10, 16, 27, 
29, 40, 42, 44-5, 51, 59, 61-2, 64, 69, 72, 76, 73-4, 79-80. However, the defense 
stipulated to the admission of a DNA report allegedly showing that blood found at 
the scene was a match for Mr. Larson. R411:84. 
The State subsequently filed an amended information adding an additional 
first degree felony charge for Aggravated Robbery. R51-5. Mr. Larson pled "not 
guilty" to the charges on October 20, 2003, and a jury trial was scheduled for 
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November 18-20, 2003. R48-50. Defense counsel filed a motion and stipulation 
for a continuance of the jury trial on November 7, 2003, so the defense could 
retain a DNA expert. R56. At a pretrial conference on November 10, 2003, the 
minute entry reflects that Mr. Larson waived his right to a speedy trial and the trial 
was rescheduled to March 24-6, 2004. R59-61. Counsel for Mr. Larson noted that 
the matter had exceeded the 120 days, stating about prior continuances, "most of 
them were either agreed to by us or one of them of course was actually my fault" 
(R512:4). Accordingly, counsel for Mr. Larson concluded, "I don't think there's 
any ground for the 120-day disposition." R512:4. Defense counsel also indicated 
his belief that Mr. Larson wanted the benefit of an expert witness testifying for the 
defense. R512:5. Mr. Larson agreed he needed an expert witness to testify in his 
defense but questioned the status of his motion for 120-day disposition/ 
5
 THE COURT: Mr. Larson, do you understand that, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You're set to go to trial on the 18th. And Mr. O'Connell is asking 
that I continue it, but I will only continue it if you are willing to waive any right 
you have to a speedy trial and you agree not to raise any more issues regarding this 
120-day disposition. 
THE DEFENDANT: How many days is it that we have in favor for my behalf 
with the 120 days, do you know? 
MR. O'CONNELL: You know, all I can tell you is that almost every continuance 
we've had we agreed to it so every time appearing after that doesn't count toward 
the 120 days. 
THE DEFENDANT: I understand, I'd like to waive my right. 
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On February 10, 2004, defense counsel filed a Motion and Stipulation for 
Continuance of the jury trial on the ground that the defense's DNA expert needed 
more time to evaluate the DNA evidence. R97. The State opposed the motion to 
continue. R413:13. A minute entry for a hearing on the motion held on February 
20, 2004, indicates that Mr. Larson waived his right to a speedy trial and his 
request for 120-day disposition; the jury trial was rescheduled to June 8-10, 2004. 
Rl05-07. Mr. Larson waived his right to a speedy trial from that time forward but 
did not want to waive any past rights. R413:15. Mr. Larson was caught between 
the proverbial rock and a hard place in that he did not want to give up his rights 
but did not want to go to trial unprepared. As the following discussion shows, Mr. 
Larson was forced by the district court to waive his rights and did not understand 
the status of his 120-day disposition: 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, the State would like the record to be clear 
that the defendant waives any detainer issues also, and we'll now be moving 
forward to trial. 
THE COURT: That's right, he did file a -
MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Right, right. And I was about to - he was asking 
me to explain that maybe there were some issues in the past with problems, but 
anything from this point on, he would waive. 
THE DEFENDANT: If my time's exceeded, I would like to press my 
rights. 
THE COURT: Okay. So you understand you're not going to get a trial date until 
sometime after the first of the year? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
R512:5. 
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THE COURT: Well, then, we're not going to continue the trial. Do you 
want to have a chat with him about it? Because I'm not going to continue the trial 
if he's going to make a problem. You can take him back in the back, if you want 
to, Mr. O'Connell 
MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Your Honor we've talked about it. There were 
some issues early on about this taking a period [ofjtime; whether or not that was 
my fault or not. And - but I've told him that the State says we're - this is facing 
from this point on. That may still be an issue from that point on, but he does want 
to waive if (sic) for now. 
THE COURT: Waive it now? He needs to waive it permanently, because 
I'm not going to grant a continuance otherwise. I don't want to have any 
problems. And he's raising the issue, and he needs to understand that we're set for 
trial. I'm willing to do the trial, but you need to understand that Mr. O'Connell is 
telling me that he can't be prepared to defend you because he needs this analysis 
done of the DNA testing. 
And if you're going to create a problem about it, then it's not going to 
happen. We're going to trial. 
And if you're willing to waive any rights you have relating to the [120-day] 
disposition and speedy trial, then I'm willing to grant a continuance. Otherwise, 
no 
MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Thanks, your Honor. I have gone over that, he's 
willing to waive at this point his speedy trial rights and we do need to continue it.. 
THE COURT: You understand, Mr. Larson, what you're doing? 
THE DEFENDANT: I feel like I'm being forced in to this. 
THE COURT: Well, you are. 
THE DEFENDANT: Because by all rights, I should have a speedy trial, 
and-
THE COURT: Well, okay, we're going to trial. End of story. You're the 
one that's pressing it. We have a trial date set already. I'm ready to go. 
THE DEFENDANT: That's not what I'm saying. 
THE COURT: This is not me. I'm not forcing anything. 
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THE DEFENDANT: That's not what I'm saying. 
THE COURT: What are you saying? I don't feel comfortable with this. 
THE DEFENDANT: I agree to waive my rights. 
THE COURT: I still don't feel comfortable with it. This just isn't going to 
happen. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I speak? 
THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. 
THE DEFENDANT: I know it's crucial to my case for my lawyer to go 
over all the DNA tests and everything. If I don't have that, then I don't have no 
chance at winning in my trial, to prove my innocence. 
But at the same time, I was charged with this crime and I filed a 120-day 
disposition, and it wasn't my fault that the trial got delayed, that the time passed, 
and it's been over a year. 
And if there's a chance I could have my case dismissed because of that, 
then I would like to go with that. But, at the same time, I know I need this DNA. 
So, I know I need the DNA more than anything, so I would like to waive my 
rights.... 
THE COURT: And I suppose you feel comfortable with that, but I want to 
feel comfortable with you . . . 
THE DEFENDANT: Do you review my speedy trial rights after the trial or 
before? 
THE COURT: No, you're waiving them. That's why. 
THE DEFENDANT: I wasn't waiving them. Would you look into that 
now or afterwards? 
THE COURT: No, I don't look in to it at all, because I'm telling you now, 
we're either going to go to trial in March or you give up those rights to a speedy 
trial, and it's over. That issue is gone. Do you understand what I'm saying? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. What's unclear in my mind is, I filed a 120-day 
disposition -
13 
THE COURT: Right. 
THE DEFENDANT: — and the time has passed; over eight months. 
THE COURT: That's true. I would think every time we've addressed the 
issue when we've continued the trial dates. 
MR. O'CONNELL, JR.: Your Honor, you're right, and people do that all 
the time, and people go past the 120 days, and their speedy trial rights, and at least 
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court has anticipated that . . . . I don't think 
we would have much grounds on that. The DNA is the important issue.. . . 
THE COURT: . . . You're willing to do it, then, Mr. Larson? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
R413.T5-21. 
At a pretrial conference conducted on May 24, 2004, the trial court 
informed Mr. Larson that he had already waived his request for 120-day 
disposition and Mr. Larson indicated he wanted to fire his counsel. R129-130.6 
6MR. O'CONNELL: . . . [Mr. Larson] has some concerns about my being 
comfortable with going to trial and I think specifically on the issue of the 120 
disposition. 
THE COURT: Well, what does that mean? Somebody better explain that to me. 
We've already taken care of that issue . .. You're too late on the 120 days. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, see, I don't feel comfortable going to my lawyer being 
that he misrepresented me already, you know. 
THE COURT: He hasn't misrepresented you, I assure of that. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I put in a 120-day disposition right when I was 
charged, right? 
THE COURT: . . . we've addressed that issue every time this has come u p . . . . 
And you waived it last time so Mr. O'Connell could do a good job for you and 
now you're telling me you want to hire another lawyer and continue this case . . . 
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THE DEFENDANT: Well, I don't - being that he misrepresented me with the - 1 
talked to him about it in the beginning -
THE COURT: Let's get it straight, he has not misrepresented anything. Mr. 
O'Connell is a good lawyer. He would do you a good job. If you want to hire 
someone, that's fine . . . 
THE DEFENDANT: I don't feel comfortable going to trial with him. 
THE COURT: Are you going to hire a lawyer? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm going to try, yeah. 
THE COURT: What if you can't hire a lawyer? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, then I'm supposed to be appointed a new lawyer. 
THE COURT: You're not going to be picking and choosing lawyers. And there 
comes a time when we're going to draw the line and you're stuck... . And any 
issue relating to the 120-day disposition, as far as I'm concerned, is a waiver. And 
if you want to waive again, then I'll consider continuing this. But if you are 
unwilling to waive, then forget it, you're going to trial on the 8th. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I want to fire him, I don't feel comfortable going to 
trial with him being that he was aware of this and he did nothing - he wouldn't 
even file the motion for me when I asked him to. Told me that I didn't have no 
rights. That it didn't matter about it. And this was six, seven months ago 
THE COURT: . . . But you just need to understand that the 120-day detainer 
disposition is gone. That time is gone. We're far beyond that. You've waived 
every time we've talked to you about continuing this trial, so that's not an issue. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understand that. 
THE COURT: And any attorney you talk to better not bring it up to me because 
I'm not going to listen 
THE DEFENDANT: . . . the thing is, I know I don't have no grounds on my 120-
day disposition, but at the beginning of all this I did have rights for that and Mr. 
O'Connell, he waived my rights without my consenting. 
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THE COURT: That's not true. 
THE DEFENDANT: By him not showing up to court and then him not filing the 
motion, what -
THE COURT: Well, it was pending, we discussed it every time. 
THE DEFENDANT: .. . well, then howr come he told me he wouldn't bring it up? 
I wanted to bring it up, he would never do i t . . * from my understanding, right, I 
was supposed to be in trial within 120 days and my time surpassed that by almost 
a whole year. And when I talked to my lawyer about it, he said that it didn't 
matter. That we'll worry about it later. He said that I don't have no grounds. 
Well, I talked to another lawyer and he told me that wasn't true. 
THE COURT: Well, that's too bad, he's giving you bad advice. The 120 days is 
history. 
THE DEFENDANT: . . . he didn't represent me in the first place [] by bringing it 
up and filing the motion . . . 
THE COURT: He did bring it up . . . . We had your trial set -
THE DEFENDANT: Then how come my case wasn't dropped? 
THE COURT: We had your trial set within that time. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, it wasn't. 
THE COURT: Listen to me, we did, and Mr. O'Connell wanted to be able to 
prepare appropriately for it and so it was continued. 
THE DEFENDANT: . . . no, my time . . . had surpassed (sic) when that happened. 
. . . It had already passed eight months. 
THE COURT: I have not reviewed the file, but I don't know.... So, I'm not 
going to discuss this 120 days anymore... . And I'm telling you right now any 
new lawyer that comes in that wants to talk about it, I'm not going to listen to 
them.... It's over. We need to just get this case set for trial and get it tried. 
Okay? Now, be realistic, but don't be ridiculous, how much time to you think you 
need to hire a lawyer? 
THE DEFENDANT: Two months. 
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On June 28, 2004, the matter was referred back to Salt Lake Legal Defenders for 
the appointment of new counsel. R135-36. 
On July 14, 2004, James Valdez entered an appearance as counsel for Mr. 
Larson and the matter was set for a hearing on Mr. Larson's motion for 120-day 
disposition (R161-2, 230-36; Addendum C ) on August 4, 2004. R147-50. At 
the hearing, Mr. Larson testified he discussed his 120-day disposition with Mr. 
O'Connell on October 8, 2003, the date of the preliminary hearing, at which time 
he asked Mr. O'Connell to file a motion to dismiss. R416:15-6. Mr. O'Connell 
THE COURT: If I give you two months . . . this case won't get set until October 
or November. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm aware of that . . . . This is my life, right? . . . And, you 
know, being that I don't trust him, that he messed up part of my case already, I 
won't go to trial with h im. . . . 
MS. FIELDS: Your Honor,.. . would the record put that the defendant is waiving 
any right with regard to the 120-day detainer by the fact that he is requesting a 
continuance. 
THE COURT: He already has . . . . 
THE DEFENDANT: Look, the only reason I did that is because [Mr. O'Connell] 
advised me to. 
THE COURT: And he gave you good advice . . . you can't take it back now. . . . 
Okay, it's on the record. We have it on the record. She's written it down. 
THE DEFENDANT: Why couldn't my case have been dropped if my time is 
surpassed (sic)? . . . I didn't want to waive i t . . . [the waiver] was only because 
[Mr. O'Connell] told that that didn't matter nothing. 
R414;3-ll. 
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advised Mr. Larson that there were no grounds to file such a motion. R416:16, 71-
2.7 On October 20, 20039 when Mr. Larson again asked Mr. O'Connell to file a 
motion to dismiss, Mr. O'Connell "said that he wouldn't file a frivolous motion." 
R416.-17. 
Mr. Larson further testified that he believed Mr. O'Connell and relied upon 
his advice. R416:18, Mr. Larson asked Mr. O'Connell on numerous occasions to 
file a motion to dismiss based on the fact that over 120 days had passed since he 
filed his request for disposition, but Mr. O'Connell repeatedly declined, telling 
Mr. Larson he "had no rights on it" and the best thing was to agree to a 
continuance. R416:20, 25-6. Mr. O'Connell told Mr. Larson he should waive his 
rights under the 120-day disposition because Mr. O'Connell was not prepared for 
trial and if Mr. Larson did not waive, he would go to trial unprepared particularly 
regarding the DNA evidence. R416:26. Mr. Larson relied on Mr. O'Connell's 
advice and initially did not speak directly to the trial court about the 120-day 
disposition because that was his attorney's role. R416:20, 27, 39, 53, 55. Mr. 
Larson also did not know that firing his court-appointed attorney was an option, 
and only did so when advised by another attorney that a motion to dismiss would 
be meritorious. R416:40, 54. 
Mr. O'Connell testified that at the time of the preliminary hearing in 
October 2003 when 120 days had already passed, his primary concern was to 
7
 Mr. O'Connell testified that while he did not believe there were any grounds to 
file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the 120-day disposition, he "didn't rule it out 
at that point either." R416:72. 
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retain a DNA expert to evaluate the evidence because none of the eyewitnesses 
were able to identify the perpetrator. R416:73. Therefore, the outcome of the case 
hinged upon that evidence. R416:73-5. At that point in October 2003, defense 
counsel did not even have any reports from the crime lab. R416:74. 
When Mr. O'Connell requested those reports from the prosecutor, he was 
told he had to subpoena the crime lab. R416:76-7. When he did so, the crime lab 
responded with a letter stating "it was going to take them sometime to get the 
information together to give it to [the defense]." R416:76-7. Accordingly, Mr. 
O'Connell had to ask the court for another continuance of the trial on November 
10, 2003, so he could obtain the needed information from the state crime lab and 
then give it to his expert for review. R416:76-7. 
On February 20, 2004, Mr. O'Connell asked for another continuance 
because his DNA expert had been retained on three cases, including Mr. Larson's, 
two of which had to be tried first and thus took precedence over Mr. Larson's 
case. R416:80. Mr. Larson was willing to agree to the continuance because he 
recognized the importance of the DNA evidence although he had concerns about 
the 120-day disposition. R416:80. Mr. O'Connell testified, "At that point 
basically we sort of had a choice, we could either pursue the 120-day disposition 
and go forward on trial in March [2004] and deal with that issue or we could 
continue the case basically and stop pursuing the 120-day disposition and give me 
a chance to do the DNA." R416:81. Mr, Larson was "worried about losing his 
120-day disposition motion" but was persuaded by his attorney that he "needed the 
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continuances more than [] 120-day disposition issues." R416:95-6, When Mr. 
Larson fired Mr. O'Connell in May 2004, Mr. O'Connell was prepared to proceed 
with the trial. R416:83. 
In February 2004, Mr. O'Connell believed Mr. Larson had a "really good 
appeal issue" with regard to his request for 120-day disposition because the trial 
court had put the defense in the impossible position of proceeding to trial 
unprepared if they did pursue a motion to dismiss. R416:84-5, 87. Mr. Larson 
was forced to choose either to pursue a motion to dismiss and go to trial 
unprepared or waive his speedy trial rights pursuant to his request for 120-day 
disposition. R416:87. Mr. O'ConnelPs recollection was that he did not become 
aware of Mr. Larson's request for 120-day disposition until the State mentioned it. 
R416:89. However, he had no recollection of any discussions between the State 
and the defense about the pending disposition. R416:92. Mr. O'Connell testified 
that he could not have been prepared to go to trial on this case within 120 days. 
R416:94-5. 
The trial court denied Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss on August 13, 2004. 
R224-6. The trial court specifically found that the request for 120-day disposition 
was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003 and would have expired on 
September 2, 2003. R238 (Addendum D), 417:3. However, the court found that 
the time was "tolled" from June 10 - July 14, 2003 on the ground that there was 
good cause to continue the preliminary hearing to a special setting and the delay 
was "therefore, attributable to the Defendant." R240, 417:4. The court also found 
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that the time was "tolled" on July 14 and again on July 28, 2003 because the 
parties were waiting to see if federal charges would be filed against Mr. Larson. 
R417:4. Therefore, the delay was again "attributable to the Defendant." 
The time was again "tolled" on August 27 - October 8, 2003 causing a 
delay "attributable to the Defendant", because Mr. Larson's counsel appeared late 
for the August preliminary hearing. R240, 417:4-5. Finally, the trial court found 
that the time was also "tolled" from November 10, 2003 until the time of his 
August 13, 2004 Ruling based on defense counsel's requests to continue the trial. 
R417:5-6. The trial court found that "the law supports a conclusion that there was 
good cause for the continuances and it should not be attributable to the 
prosecutor." R417:6. Accordingly, the trial court found that only 71 days of the 
120 had expired. R241, 417:11. 
Mr. Larson's counsel then made a motion to continue the trial to allow him 
time to prepare for DNA evidence, to which the State objected. R228-9; R417:7. 
When Mr. Larson agreed that his counsel should have time to prepare himself for 
trial, the trial court granted the defense's motion. R417:7-8. 
Over the State's objection, Mr. Larson later fired Mr. Valdez and the 
scheduled trial date was stricken as a result. R257-8, 276-91; R419:3-5. Mr. 
Larson requested additional time on December 13, 2004, for his family to retain 
private counsel. R292-3. Then on January 3, 2004, Mr. Larson filed his pro se 
Motion to Appeal Judge Barratt's Decision of Ruling on the Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss, Pursuant to 120 Day Disposition Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1, wherein 
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he sought 'to have the above formentioned (sic) case appealed in the Utah 
Supreme Court, State of Utah . . , " R302-10, Exhibit E. The trial court denied 
this motion on the ground that "no appeal could be addressed until there was a 
trial." R321. 
Mr. Larson subsequently retained attorney D. Christopher VanCampen in 
January 2005 and waived his right to a speedy trial on January 24, 2005. R324, 
328-9. On February 14, 2005, and with Mr. VanCampen's assistance, Mr. Larson 
pleaded guilty to three counts of Aggravated Robbery with a weapons 
enhancement, pursuant to State v. Sery, supra, so he could "pursu[e] his rights to 
appeal." R340 (Addendum F); R420:3-4. 
Mr. Larson was sentenced to prison for three consecutive six-years-to-life 
commitments on April 4, 2005. R345-6;R421;9. Additional facts will be cited 
herein as warranted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Larson's motion to 
dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute (now repealed). The court did not 
address the State's burden of compliance notwithstanding the facts demonstrating 
that the State failed to meet that burden. Further, the district court's findings and 
conclusions that delays were attributable to Mr. Larson and supported by good 
cause are clearly erroneous and incorrect. 
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Mr. Larson was also denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel when his trial counsel failed to appear at the preliminary hearing and 
failed to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MR. LARSON'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO THE 
SPEEDY TRIAL STATUTE, 
The determination of whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute involves a two-step inquiry. 
First, an appellate court must determine when the disposition period commenced 
and when it expired. Second, the appellate court "must then determine whether 
good cause excused the delay." State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d at 186 (citations and 
quotations omitted). Good cause may be found if a delay was caused by the 
defendant such as in asking for a continuance or by "unforeseen problems arising 
immediately prior to trial." Id. at 187 (citations omitted). 
Mr. Larson's Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges was 
delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003, and filed with the trial court on May 16, 
2003. R21 -3; R416:5 5. From the record, it is apparent that the first time Mr. 
Larson's request for disposition was even discussed was at a pretrial conference on 
November 20, 2003, long after the initial 120 days had expired. R512:4. The 
prosecution never raised the issue prior to expiration of the 120 days. See, 
R409:l-2 (June 10, 2003 transcript); R409:l (July 14, 2003 transcript); R409:l-3 
(July 28, 2003 transcript); R31-3 and R410:6-7 (although the trial court found Mr. 
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Larson waived his right to a speedy trial because his counsel failed to appear on 
time, the State did not bring Mr. Larson's request for disposition to the trial court's 
attention at that time, nor was it discussed). Thus, the record demonstrates that 
Mr. Larson's request for disposition was not addressed with the district court until 
after 120 days had already expired. 
In its August 13, 2004 ruling denying Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss under 
the speedy trial statute, the district court found there was good cause to delay the 
matter and determined that all delays were attributable to Mr. Larson. R417. The 
court further concluded that only 71 of the 120 days had elapsed since the notice 
was delivered to the Warden on May 5, 2003. R241; R417:l 1. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(3) (repealed) imposed upon the prosecutor the 
affirmative obligation to ensure that good cause for any delay is "shown in open 
court." The statute also provided that the disposition period commenced upon the 
date the notice is delivered to the Warden. Subsection (4) required the prosecutor 
"to have the matter heard within the time required" and directed that the district 
court "shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice" if the prosecutor's failure 
to have the matter heard within the 120 days "is not supported by good cause[.]" 
This language "clearly places the burden of complying with the statute on 
the prosecutor." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998) (concluding that 
although Heaton's motion to dismiss was properly denied, the trial "court clearly 
erred in concluding that Heaton was in the same position as the State and therefore 
shared some of the responsibility to find out why his case had not been set for 
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trial"). The prosecutor "may not passively accept a defendant's delay of [a 
hearing], and then turn around and claim the delay kept the prosecution from 
meeting its burden." State v. Wagenman, 71 P.3d at 187 (remanding the matter 
back to the district court with instructions to dismiss with prejudice because "the 
State had failed to request that the trial court make its good cause determination in 
open court pursuant to section 77-29-1(3)" (as cited in State v. Pedockie, 95 P.3d 
1182, 1188 (Utah App. 2004)). 
When a prisoner causes a delay of the trial, "he indicates his willingness to 
temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial." State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916. 
However, there must be "sufficient evidence to support a finding that, but for the 
defendant's actions, the trial would have been brought within the required 
disposition period." State v. Hankerson, 122 P.3d 561, 565 (Utah 2005). The 
district court made no such finding in this case. 
The State's sole burden of compliance cannot be met simply by a showing 
that a delay was not caused by the prosecutor. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 
("to hold that good cause is supported by the lone fact that the delay was not 
caused by the prosecutor would contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) 
which places the burden of complying with the statute on the prosecution") 
(citations omitted). Implicit in the prosecutor's "affirmative duty" to have the 
matter heard within the statutory period is "the duty to notify the court that a 
detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to comply with the 
statute." Id. 
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A, The State failed to meet its burden of compliance. 
During the first 120 days after Mr. Larson filed his notice for disposition, 
the matter was delayed because the State sought a stipulation to continue the 
preliminary hearing and then passively waited for the federal government to bring 
charges against Mr. Larson. R24-5; R26-9, By the August 27, 2003 preliminary 
hearing when Mr. Larson's counsel appeared late resulting in another continuance, 
expiration of the 120 days was only one week away. R30-31, 35-9. During the 
initial 120 days, the prosecutor never brought Mr. Larson's notice of disposition to 
the district court's attention and the court never made a determination in open 
court that any of those delays were supported by good cause. Thus, the plain 
language of the statute was not complied with. 
Several months later, the district court determined only in hindsight that all 
delays were for good cause and attributable to Mr. Larson either because he 
stipulated to the continuances or because his counsel appeared late, which 
circumstance was beyond Mr. Larson's control, as noted on the record. R410:7. 
Addendum D. The district court did not acknowledge the State's burden of 
compliance in its ruling or the fact that the State consistently disregarded Mr. 
Larson's request for disposition and made no effort to bring this matter to trial 
within 120 days. The State did not even provided the critical DNA evidence to the 
defense until long after the 120 days had expired. 
As demonstrated in record cited above, the State did not notify the district 
court that a detainer notice had been filed or make any good faith effort to comply 
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with the statute. The State also failed to request the trial court to make any 
determination of good cause for delay in open court as required under Utah Code 
Ann. §77-29-1(3) until long after the 120 days had expired. 
The trial court's analysis and its conclusions are incorrect as a matter of law 
because it failed to address the Staters statutorily imposed obligation to make a 
good faith effort to bring this matter to trial within 120 days. Thus, while Mr. 
Larson has the burden at this juncture of demonstrating that the trial court's factual 
findings in this context are clearly erroneous, the trial court made no factual 
findings relative to whether the State met its burden of compliance. It simply 
disregarded that burden. Accordingly, the district court's analysis and conclusions 
are inherently flawed and there are no factual findings for Mr. Larson to contest. 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence on the record to support a finding that the 
State even recognized or tried to comply with its obligations imposed under Utah 
Code Ann. §77-29-1, particularly within the first 120 days after Mr. Larson filed 
his notice. The State failed to meet its burden of compliance. 
B. The evidence does not support a finding of good cause for delay. 
It is apparent from the record that although defense counsel stipulated to a 
continuance of the preliminary hearing scheduled on June 10, 2003, that 
stipulation was requested by the prosecutor and given to accommodate the 
prosecutor because the State had 13-14 witnesses. R409:l. When the court tried to 
reschedule that hearing for 2 weeks later, it was the prosecutor who was 
unavailable. R409:2. On July 14, 2003, both counsel stipulated to another 
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continuance because the State anticipated the federal government would indict Mr. 
Larson. R26-7; R409:l. Then on July 28, 2003, defense counsel requested a 
preliminary hearing, which the court then scheduled for August 27, 2003 and 
October 8, 2003 as a "back-up" date. August 27, 2003 was one week prior to the 
expiration of the 120 days and October 8, 2003 was more than a month beyond it. 
Notwithstanding these facts demonstrating that the State made no effort to 
bring this matter to trial within 120 days, the State's actions prevented that from 
occurring in any event. The State failed to provide the crime lab report and critical 
DNA evidence to the defense until long after the initial 120 days had expired. The 
district court ignored this dispositive fact in its ruling. There is no evidence that 
the State's failure to timely provide this critical evidence to the defense was 
supported by good cause. Thus the district court's finding of good cause is clearly 
erroneous and Mr. Larson's motion to dismiss should have been granted. 
At the time of the October 8, 2003 preliminary hearing, which was well 
beyond the initial 120 days, the State had not even provided a copy of the crime 
lab report to the defense. R416:74. The State obviously had this evidence at the 
time of the preliminary hearing since the report was admitted then. R411:84. This 
evidence was critical because none of the eyewitnesses could identify Mr. Larson. 
R411:84; R416:73. The outcome of trial hinged upon the DNA evidence and the 
defense could not prepare adequately for trial without it. R416:73-5. 
When defense counsel requested the DNA evidence from the prosecutor 
after the initial 120 days, the prosecutor not only would not provide it but told 
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defense counsel he had to obtain that evidence by subpoenaing the crime lab. 
R416:76-7. When defense counsel did so, the state crime lab responded with a 
letter delaying the matter even farther, stating "it was going to take them sometime 
to get the information together" (R416:76-7). Because this information had 
already been provided to the prosecutor and admitted at the preliminary hearing, 
this dilatory conduct on the part of the State was unwarranted and it served only to 
unnecessarily delay Mr. Larson's trial even further. 
Because of this unnecessary delay attributable to the State, defense counsel 
was forced to request another continuance of the trial that was then scheduled on 
November 10, 2003, which date was more than two months after the expiration of 
the 120 days. Id. 
The defense could not proceed to trial without the crime lab report. The 
State would not make that report available to them until long after the 120 days 
had passed. The district court did not address this dilatory conduct on the part of 
the State in its ruling when it found that the delays were attributable only to Mr. 
Larson. Moreover, the court's and the State's conduct placed the defense in the 
impossible position of proceeding to trial unprepared if they did pursue a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial statute. R416:73-7, 81, 84-5, 87, 95-6. 
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Larson's motion to 
dismiss because the State took a both an affirmative and a passive role in allowing 
this matter to be unnecessarily delayed. Id; R24-5, 26-9; R409. The first 
continuance of the preliminary hearing was sought to accommodate the State. 
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R409:2. Further, during the initial 120 days the prosecutor did not notify the 
district court about Mr. Larson's pending request for disposition nor take any 
measures to ensure that good cause for delay was shown in open court. Mr. 
Larson's request was simply ignored. Therefore, the district court's factual 
finding that all delays were attributable to Mr. Larson is clearly erroneous. 
The first time Mr. Larson's constitutional right to a speedy trial was even 
discussed was on August 27, 2003, about one week prior to the expiration of the 
initial 120 days. R30-1; 35-9; R410:6. At that time, the trial court concluded, 
over Mr. Larson's objection, that Mr. Larson's attorney had waived his right to a 
speedy trial when he had not appeared 15 minutes after the hearing was scheduled 
to begin. Id. This legal conclusion that an attorney can waive a defendant's right 
to a speedy trial over his client's objection is incorrect as a matter of law. 
From the outset, because constitutional rights belong exclusively to the 
defendant, an attorney cannot waive any such rights, particularly over the 
defendant's objection. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that defense 
counsel's failure to appear at a preliminary hearing scheduled one week prior to 
the expiration of the initial 120-day period caused the trial to be held outside the 
120 days. See, State v. Hankerson, 122 P.3d 684 (Utah 2005) (noting that 
defendant's motion to dismiss did not cause the trial to be delayed beyond the 120 
days). 
Finally, after the initial 120 days when Mr. Larson wanted to pursue a 
motion to dismiss under the speedy trial statute, the district court repeatedly 
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coerced and forced Mr. Larson to waive his right by unjustly placing him in the 
impossible position of giving up his speedy trial remedy or going to trial 
unprepared. R412:5;R413:15-21;R414:3-11;R416:26, 81, 84-5, 87,95-6. The 
United State Supreme Court has described just such judicial action of forcing a 
criminal defendant to surrender one constitutional right in favor of another as 
"intolerable." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); see also, Hunt 
v. Mitchell 261 F.3d 575, 584 (6th Cir. 2001) ("While Hunt's statutory right to a 
speedy trial under Ohio law may not equate precisely to his constitutional right to 
a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, the element of coerced choice decried 
by the Court in Simmons is nevertheless present here. When Hunt refused to 
waive his right to a speedy trial, the trial court effectively forced him to go to trial 
with an unprepared attorney."). 
Based on these facts and the applicable law, the trial court's factual 
findings are clearly erroneous and its legal conclusions are incorrect in multiple 
instances. First, the State would not provide the critical DNA evidence to the 
defense until long after the initial 120 days had expired, thereby making it 
impossible for Mr. Larson to proceed to trial. Second, the prosecutor never 
informed the trial court of Mr. Larson's request for disposition, nor did it fulfill its 
affirmative duty to have the court make a showing of good cause in open court. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the State diligently sought to bring this matter 
to trial within the 120 days. To the contrary, the State took both an alternating 
affirmative and a passive role in delaying this matter. 
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Further, a lawyer's deficient performance cannot waive his client's right to 
a speedy trial, particularly when the defendant expressly objects to such waiver. 
That right belongs exclusively to the defendant. Lastly, when the trial court 
finally addressed Mr. Larson's request for disposition after the 120 days had 
already expired, the court repeatedly and expressly admitted to forcing Mr. Larson 
to give up his right to a speedy trial or lose his right to a fair one. Thus, Mr. 
Larson was improperly forced to give up one important due process right to 
preserve another important due process right. 
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Larson's 
motion to dismiss. 
II. MR. LARSON WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL AND PREJUDICED BY HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
Mr. Larson's constitutional right to counsel was compromised because his 
trial counsel rendered deficient performance that prejudiced him. Mr. O'Connell 
rendered deficient performance when he appeared late at the August 27, 2003 
preliminary hearing and when he did not file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the 
speedy trial statute. 
Both federal and State courts recognize a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984) is the seminal case adopted by Utah courts which established the two-
pronged test for determining whether the right to counsel is violated: (1) whether 
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) 
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whether the defendant was prejudiced by the objectively deficient performance, 
i.e., there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the results would have been different. See also, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000) (reiterating the reasonable probability standard to establish prejudice). 
A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during all critical 
stages in the proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 
1069 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 995, 48 L. Ed. 2d 820, 96 S. Ct. 2209 
(1976); United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 
U.S. 1038, 93 L. Ed. 2d 845, 107 S. Ct. 893 (1987); United States v. Garrett, 90 
F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 444, 116 S. Ct. 540 (1995); Garcia v. State, 846 So. 2d 
I 
660, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Browning v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360, 
362-63 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Ind.App. 5 
Dist. 1992); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314, 316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Beals v. 
State, 802 P.2d 2, 4 (Nev. 1990); State v. Harell, 80 Wn. App. 802, 804, 911 P.2d 
1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); see also, United States v. White, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 
185, 659 F.2d 231, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Hoyt, 18 F. Supp. 2d 
477, 479-480 (D. Pa. 1998). 
The district court expressly found that Mr. O'Connell's conduct had 
"impeded the administration of justice [and] . . . his client's right to a speedy 
trial." R37; Addendum B. Thus while Mr. Larson disagrees that this counsel's 
failure to appear could be imputed to Mr. Larson as a waiver of Mr. Larson's 
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rights, that his counsel's performance was objectively deficient and prejudicial to 
Mr. Larson is a matter of record. Mr. O'Connell's late appearance on August 27, 
2003 resulted in the preliminary hearing being continued and unnecessarily 
delayed the matter for several more weeks. Had Mr. O'Connell appeared on time, 
the time between the preliminary hearing and the trial date would have 
additionally accrued against the State. Over 70 days passed between August 27 
and November 10, 2003, when defense counsel requested another continuance so 
he could obtain the DNA evidence. Adding that time to the 71 days the trial court 
found had already accrued against the State in its August 13 2004 ruling, the trial 
court would have to have found that over 140 days had passed, thus requiring 
dismissal of the case. R241; R417:l 1. Therefore, Mr. Larson was prejudiced by 
his counsel's late appearance. 
Further, Mr. O'Connell's refusal to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to the 
speedy trial statute was also deficient performance that prejudiced Mr. Larson. In 
particular and notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous findings of good cause 
for delay discussed above, Mr. O'Connell knew that the DNA evidence was 
critical in this case and that the State would not provide it to him until long after 
the initial 120 days had expired. This delay was attributable solely to the State, as 
Mr. O'Connell was aware. R416:76-7. Had Mr. O'Connell raised this dispositive 
fact with the trial court in a proper motion to dismiss, such motion should have 
been granted, thereby resulting in a different outcome. Therefore, Mr, Larson was 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure and refusal to file that motion. 
34 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Larson respectfully requests this Court to find (1) that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the speedy trial 
statute; and (2) that Mr. Larson's trial counsel rendered deficient performance that 
prejudiced Mr. Larson. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of January, 2008. 
.. -^ if 
Jennifer K. Gowan<r 
Attorney for Mr. Larson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of January, 2008,1 caused to be hand-
delivered a 2 true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the 
following: 
Joanne C. Slotnik 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South 
6th Floor 
PO Box 140854 




UT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,? 
NOTICE AND REQUEST. FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE(S) 
TO: DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 40r-C "* '" 
Notice is hereby given that I, Sf\d/]J/J (i. Ljf$0/) 
(Inmate Name) do hereby request final disposition. Char^^jf^c-of^ ot 
h(]Q. R$. * hziM.hwi*m. £u£af. Persm gfea^
 n | j , f 
pending against. ,me in -th'e . 1M$@B MMt (Mrf *df fttffa^ NJffifecfc, "« 
brought by §Sf'UH fart *' fit ffiitTii ( p i S ^ t f n g 
agency e.g., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the StaTle of 
Utah) and request is hereby made that you forward this notice to 
the appropriate authorities together with such information as 
required by law. 
Dated this jf) day of npfll, 2$3 (Month / Year) 
Inmate's Name SilMJ/l LtfSd/l USP# 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
I hereby certify that I have received a copy of the foregoing 
notice this 1> day of AVh i^  H'3> (Month / Year) . 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020 
CUCF, PO Box 898, Gunnison, Utah 84634 
(Revised 10/2000) . V • ** # / ^ 
(TMF 05/05.06,C) JT ^ :^ W ^ 
C;S>" 






;ate of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
(801)576-7000 
8 May 2003 
Salt Lake County Prosecuting Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
SLC,UT 84111 
RE: Larson, Shawn 
U.S.P.# 25181/88278 DOB: 01/02/78 
YOUR CASE UNKNOWN 
Dear Sirs: 
MR/MRS/MS Shawp Larson is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. He/She is 
requesting disposition of untried charges of Agg Robbery, pending in your jurisdiction. 
Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his request. 
Thank you for your assistance with this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 




cc: Third District Court Clerk 
inmate file 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS 
120-DAY DISPOSITION 
TO: Third District Court Clerk 
RE: Larson, Shawn 
Inmate Name 
TERM of COMMITMENT: Agg Robbery 1-15 
TIME SERVED: Approx 06 year(s) 11 mo 
TIME REMAINING: Approx. 08 year(s) 01 mo 
**time calculated may not Include toll time/credit, time seirred 
PAROLE ELIGIBILITY: scheduled for parole 00/00/00 
Returned on parole violation 05-07-03;-Ncw commit 09-QO^OO 
BOARD OF PARDONS DECISION: Hearing set for 00/000000 
Possibly expiration: 11-29-2010 
Mr. Scott Carver, Director 
Institutional Operations 
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit 
Utah State Prison 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : ORDER OF CONTEMPT 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 031902498 
vs. : 
SHAWN DAVID LARSON, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter was given a special setting for a preliminary 
hearing before the Court on August 27, 2003, at 9:00 a.m. It was 
originally a second place setting behind a felony trial and Notice 
was given on July 28, 2003. Present at the scheduling conference 
were Sharon Fields, prosecutor for the State, and John O'Connell, 
Jr., the defendant's attorney. The defendant was also present, 
having been transported from the Utah State Prison. 
Present at the hearing were twelve citizen witnesses 
subpoenaed by the State of Utah; the State!s attorney, Sharon 
Fields; the defendant, who had again been transported from the 
State Prison; and court personnel, including a court reporter. 
Pursuant to Section 78-32-2, Utah Code Ann., the Court enters 
the following findings of fact: 
1. Mr. O'Connell was present with his client when this 
matter was originally set. 
-Zrf-? 
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2. All other persons necessary for the hearing to proceed 
were present on the day of the hearing. 
3. The defendant had been transported from the Utah State 
Prison for the hearing. 
4. A court reporter was present because the matter involved 
eleven first degree felony counts. 
5. Twelve citizens, alleged victims of aggravated assault, 
were present. Each had taken time off work or school or other 
duties and had adjusted their schedules to be present at the 
hearing. 
6. The State's prosecutor had spoken to Mr. O'Connell two 
days prior to the hearing regarding the possibility of stipulating 
to portions of the witnesses' proposed testimony. 
7. The court clerk called Mr. O'Connell's office on the 
morning of the hearing, and was informed Mr. O'Connell did not have 
the matter set on his calendar. 
8. Mr. O'Connell did not appear at the hearing and the Court 
dismissed the witnesses and continued the hearing. 
9. Mr. O'Connell appeared approximately one-haIf hour later 
and stated he did not know why he didn't have the matter 
calendared. 
10. After waiting nearly 20 minutes for Mr. O'Connell to 
appear and his failing to do so, the Court terminated the hearing. 
-zip 
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THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, the Legal Defenders Association to 
pay the cost of the 12 witnesses present in the courtroom, at the 
rate of $18.50 per witness, transportation costs for the defendant 
in the amount of $48.00, and for the presence of the court 
reporter, $60.00. These amounts are due within thirty (30) days of 
the date of the Court's Order. 
In addition, the Court finds Mr. John O'Connell, Jr., in 
contempt of Court for neglect of his duties as an officer of the 
court. Based upon his failure to appear, Mr. O'Connell has impeded 
the administration of justice, he has impinged upon his client's 
right to a speedy trial, has caused unnecessary and disruptive 
burden of judicial resources, and has caused severe inconvenience 
to the citizens who appeared in court for the scheduled hearing. 
Mr. O'Connell is hereby found in contempt for so doing and fined in 
the amount of $300.00, which amount is due within thirty (30) days 
of the date of this Order. 
Mr. O'Connell's actions have disrupted the 12 citizens of this 
state who had to leave work, school and other matters, and has 
inconvenienced them in their activities. The conduct reflects 
adversely upon the administration of justice in this District/and 
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are all attributed to Mr. O'Connell's failure to appear at this 
special setting hearing. 
3 Dated this day of Septemb 
^~^Xy 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order of Contempt, to the following, this day of 
September, 2 003: 
Sharon Fields 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John O'Connell, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
7T 
TabC 
JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308) tH'R-n 1" 'V '
 c 
Attomey for SHAWN DAVE) LARSON „n oQ ?W: ^ 
466 South400 East Suite 102 W*J J" " „ , . „ j H 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 <;MT uk*E C ! ° u " 
Telephone: (801) 328-3999 " . 
Facsimile: (801)328-3998
 e . , _ . - : ^ T o ^ 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHAWN DAVID LARSON 
MOTION 
TO DISMISS PURSUANT 
TO DEFENDANTS DEMAND 
FOR DISPOSITION PURSUANT 
Utah Code Ann. 77-29-5 
: Case No. 031902498 FS 
Defendant. : JUDGE: WILLIAM BARRETT 
The.defendant, SHAWN BAVTD.LARSON, through.his. attorney .of record, 
JAMES A. VALDEZ, hereby submits his motion to dismiss and in so doing incorporates 
by reference his previous filed pro se documents, entitled Motion for Speedy Trial or 
Disposition of Warrant(s), .Complaint(s) .or Indictments.) signed .on May ,6,, 2QQ3 and 
acknowledged as filed by the Third District Court, in and for the State of Utah, Salt Lake 
Division, on May 16,2003. 
D-efendant.now.moves.the.cQurt.tO-dismiss. Ithas.heen.approximately one year 
and ten weeks since the filing of the request for disposition and defendant has not had a 
trial. 
Defendant is awaiting transcripts of all proceedings in order to calculate the 
amount of time, number of waivers, number of questionable waivers and time that may 
\l o\ 
have tolled. Upon receipt of those transcripts defendant will file a memorandum of 
points and authorities. 
Datedihis / L / y d a y .ofiuly, 2Q04. 
[LDEZ N 
for SHAWN DAVTO LARSON 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney 2001 South State Street, S3700, Salt Lake City Utah 84190 on the 
2004. JHP day of. 
\ 
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JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
466 South 400 East, Suite 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3999 
Facsimile: (801) 328-3998 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE AND OTHER DEPARTMENTS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : RESPONSE TO STATE'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
Plaintiff. TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
: DISMISS 
v. 
SHAWN DAVID LARSON : 
Case No. 031902498 FS 
Defendant. : Honorable William W. Barrett 
Notice was given that SHAWN DAVID LARSON requested final disposition of any 
charges(s) now pending against him in any court in the State of Utah. 
The State in their memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss concedes 
that notice of defendant's request for 120 day disposition was filed on May 3,2003. Further that 
defendant was in fact serving time on a commitment for a parole violation in the Utah State Prison. 
Defendant's first court appearance was on April 23,2003 wherein his case was scheduled 
for Roll Call on May 1,2003, thereafter scheduled for Preliminary Hearing on May 16,2003 before 
Judge Quinn, wherein it was acknowledged on the court docket that a request for disposition had 
been filed. (See Court Docket page 5) 
The next hearing was scheduled as a preliminary hearing before Judge Maughan for June 
1 
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10,2003. That would be 38 days from the date of filing of the Notice of Request for disposition 
without counting the day of filing,, May 3,2003. 
June 10,2003 the Preliminary Hearing was reset for July 3,2003, 
"Based on the calender being so full today, counsel request this preliminary 
hearing be set over as a special setting, as the state has 11 victims that 
need to testify. Special Set in is scheduled and counsel stipulate to date." 
(Docket p. 5, State attachment B). 
See the transcript of the proceedings page 1: 
MR. O'CONNELL: Could we call Shawn Larson? 
MS. FIELDS; Sharon Fields for the State. 
THE COURT: What's happening on this one? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, this was set today but there's lots of witnesses in this case -
MS. FIELDS: I have eleven victims, Your Honor. 
MR. O'CONNELL: And we talked about this on Monday and figured that with eleven witnesses plus 
the discussion this morning (inaudible), we're going to ask for a special setting (inaudible). 
THE COURT: How much time do you need to be ready? 
MS. FIELDS: Your Honor, I have eleven victims plus totally, plus at least three law enforcement 
officers, so 13 or 14 witnesses. We'll probably nee a couple - to three hours in the afternoon, 
something like that. 
THE COURT: Do you want a Tuesday or a Thursday. This is Tuesday. Do you waniTanother 
(inaudible)? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Either one will be fine. I mean Pll make arrangements. 
THE COURT: And do you want morning or afternoon? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Whichever one, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We could do two weeks from today, June 24th. 
2 
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MS. FIELDS: I can't do that, Your Honor, I'll be gone. 
THE COURT: I'm trying to help but I don't know if I 'm... 
MS. FIELDS: The week of the 24th I have a trial four days. 
THE COURT: I could do it July 3rd, that's a Thursday. 
MS. FIELDS: That would be fine. 
THE COURT: July 3rd. 
MR. O'CONNELL: July 3rd works. 
THE COURT: Do you want it in the afternoon again? 
MR. O'CONNELL: That's fine. 
(June 10,2003, transcript, p.l - 2) 
Nowhere in the hearing transcript of June 10,2003, is there a waiver from SHAWN 
DAVID LARSON, nor is there any finding that there is "good cause" to continue the matter by the 
court. Note also that there is no is mention by the prosecution of the pending request for 
disposition. More importantly it is a continuance which is more at the convenience of 
the prosecution because of the numerous witnesses and the court rather than the defendant. 
The time period between June 10,2003 and July 3,2003 is 24 days. 
July 2,2003 docket entry page 5: 
"07-02-03 PRELIMINARY HEARING Cancelled. 
Reason: Stipulation of Counsel" 
No indication of a waiver by defendant, no transcript of defendant acknowledging or 
consenting to the continuance. A status hearing was scheduled for July 14,2003, therein continued 
to see of federal charges would be filed. The status conference is set for July 28,2003. Thereafter 
3 
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the case was reset to see if Federal charges would be filed. Although the continuance is agreed and 
even requested by defense counsel, Mr. O'Connell, no colloquy is held with the defendant, the 
defendant does not waive on the record nor does the court make a finding of" good cause" for the 
delay. The matter seemed to be reset for October 8,2003. The transcript is confusing as to the date 
of the preliminary hearing date. (See July 28,2003, transcript pages 1-3). 
One might speculate that both the defense and the prosecution had expectations that 
everything including the disposition issue would simply go away if the case was picked up by the 
Federal Government. The case would simply be dismissed in the State Court. That of course did not 
occur. 
A preliminary hearing was scheduled for August 27th, 2003, Defense counsel was not present 
and the hearing was rescheduled for October 8,2003. Once again no colloquy with the defendant 
for the purpose of acquiring a waiver of the disposition issue . 
The preliminary hearing was held and defendant was bound over arraigned on October 8, 
2003 then rescheduled and a pretrial conference was scheduled for October 20, 2003. (See Court 
Docket at page 10) 
At the October 20,2003 pretrial conference before Judge Barrett, mention was made of the 
120 day disposition for the first time since the matter was brought up before judge Quinn at the May 
16,2003 hearing. 
No discussion was conducted with defendant, waiver sought on the record nor finding of 
"good cause" for the delay mentioned. To this point it has been 170 days since defendant filed his 
request for disposition. The trial is set for November 19,20, and 21,2003. (See October 20,2003 
transcript, page 1 -3). 
4 
-~7 
On November 11,2003 the jury trial is reset for March 25, 2004. For the first time there 
is a mention in the Court Docket on page 11 that the "defendant waives his right to a speedy trial and 
the trial is continued ". It has now been 191 days since the defendant has filed his request for a 
speedy disposition of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that section 77-29-1 places the burden of compliance 
on the prosecutor. State v. Petersen, 810 P. 2d 421,426 (Utah 1991), State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 
(Utah 1985). As the Court explained, "the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the 
defendant's matter heard within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify the 
court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to comply with the statute." 
State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). The Utah Appellate Court has also acknowledged 
that it is the prosecutor's duty to ensure that the defendant is brought to trial within 120 days after 
filing a notice. State v. Lindsay, 2000 Ut App 379, State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App. 281 and more 
recently, State v. Pedockie, 2004 Ut App 224 at If 22. 
Where a defendant is not brought to trial within the proscribed time, "good cause may 
support the prosecutor's failure to comply." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915-16. Good cause is not shown 
where "the prosecutor's failure is inaction," Id. At 916, such as "doing nothing whatsoever to bring 
[the defendant's] case to trial within the statutory period." Id. Neither is it shown simply by the fact 
that "the delay was not caused by the prosecutor." Peterson, 810 P.2d at 426. 
Ultimately, the trial court may find good cause based upon its underlying findings of fact 
with regard to the reason for the delay. Heaton, at 916-17, See Pedokie at f25-27. Some facts that 
have formed a reasonable basis for finding of "good cause" for delay include conflicts of interest 
5 
with the defense counsel where the delay was not prolonged, Peterson, 810 P.2d at 426-27; the 
defendant's request for a preliminary hearing after a hearing had already been waived, Heaton, at 
916, illness of the defense counsel; State v. Bullock, 699 R2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985), and the 
defendant's change of defense counsel along with several requests for continuances and an agreement 
to postpone the trial. State v. Phathammavon, 860 P.2d 1001,1004 (Utah Ct. App.1993); State v. 
Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319,1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also State v. Pedokie, 2004 UT App. 224, 
at f 26 quoting State v. Huston, 2003 UT App 416, % 11, 82 P.3d 219, ". . .relatively short delay 
caused by unforseen problems arising immediately prior to trial" 
CONCLUSION 
The period of delays should not be attributable to Mr. Larson. Mr. Larson was not advised 
on the record, nor did he ever waive on the record until the hearing on November 10th, 2003. 
There is no record as to the reason only a docket entry that the defendant waived his right to a speedy 
trial. The prosecutor who had a duty to inform the trial court of the need for urgency due to the 
notice and demand for 120 - day disposition, did not so inform the court. See Heaton Id.at 915, In 
these circumstances the trial court should not find that the periods of delays are attributable to Mr. 
Larson. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ L day of ^ T ^ S ^ ,2004. 
/ a l d e z 7 
:orney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to State's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress was delivered to Sharon Fields 
Deputy District Attorney and Katherine Peters, Deputy District 
Attorney, in person or to 111 East Broadway Suite 400, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on the * day of /^~^p 2004 




DAV1D E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
SHARON FIELDS, Bar No. 7518 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
^ 5 ? -
SHAWN DAVID LARSON, 
Petitioner, 
-vs~ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND COURT ORDER 
Case No. 031902498 FS 
Honorable William W. Barrett 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and hearing arguments from the 
parties concerning the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss filed July 29, 2004, hereby enters 
the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Court Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Defendant requested 120-day disposition of the charges in the case at bar 
on May 5, 2003. Accordingly, the 120-day period for the State to bring the 
Defendant to trial expired on September 2, 2003. 
2. The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was scheduled for June 10, 2003. Due 
to the high number of preliminary hearings scheduled that day, counsel 
stipulated to a continuance of the Preliminary Hearing until July 14, 2003. 
t± 
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3. At the Preliminary Hearing on July 14, 2003, counsel stipulated to a 
continuance awaiting a determination by the U.S. Attorney's Office whether 
federal charges would be filed against the Defendant. Consequently, the 
Preliminary Hearing was continued to July 28, 2003. 
4. At the Preliminary Hearing on July 28, 2003, counsel stipulated to yet another 
continuance relating to the issue of federal charges. The Preliminary Hearing 
was continued to August 27, 2003. 
5. The Preliminary Hearing on August 27, 2003 was continued to October 8, 
2003 because counsel for the Defendant failed to appear. 
6. The Preliminary Hearing was held on October 8, 2003 and the Defendant was 
bound over for trial. A pretrial conference was scheduled for November 10, 
2003 and jury trial was scheduled for November 18, 19, and 20, 2003. 
7. At the Pretrial Conference on November 10, the Defendant requested a 
continuance of the jury trial. The jury trial was continued to March 24, 25, 
and 26 2004. 
8. On February 12, 2004, the Defendant filed a motion to continue the trial. The 
continuance was granted, a pretrial conference was scheduled for May 24, 
2004, and the jury trial was rescheduled for June 8, 9, and 10 2004. 
9. At the pretrial conference on May 24, 2004, the Defendant requested leave to 
dismiss court appointed counsel and to retain private counsel. The request 
was granted and the Defendant was given 60 days to secure counsel. The 
Defendant failed to retain private counsel by the date of the scheduling 
conference on June 28,2004. On July 12, 2004, The Court appointed conflict 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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counsel for the Defendant. On July 14, 2004, James Valdez made an 
appearance on behalf of the Defendant and informed the Court that the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was forthcoming. A hearing date was set for 
the motion and a jury trial was rescheduled for August 24, 25, and 26, 2004. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from June 10, 2003 to 
July 14, 2003 based upon the stipulation of counsel. Such delay is, therefore, 
attributable to the Defendant. 
2. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from July 14, 2003 to 
July 28, 2003 based upon the stipulation of counsel awaiting a determination 
by the U.S. Attorney's Office whether federal charges would be filed against 
the Defendant. Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant. 
3. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from July 28, 2003 to 
August 27, 2003 based upon the stipulation of counsel relating to the issue of 
federal charges. Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant. 
4. There was good cause to delay the Preliminary Hearing from August 27, 2003 
to October 8, 2003 based upon defense counsel's failure to appear. Such 
delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant. 
5. There was good cause to delay the trial from November 18, 19, and 20, 2003 
until March 24, 25, and 26, 2004 based upon Defendant's request for 
continuance. Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant. 
-?un 
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6. There was good cause to delay the trial from March 24, 25, and 26, 2004 to 
June 8, 9, and 10, 2004 based upon Defendant's request for continuance. 
Such delay is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant. 
7. There was good cause to delay the trial from June 8, 9, and 10, 2004 to 
August 24, 25, and 26, 2004 biased upon Defendant's request for new counsel 
and for continuance. Such detey is, therefore, attributable to the Defendant. 
8. There was good cause to delay the trial from August 24, 25, and 26, 2004 to 
December 7, 8, and 9, 2004 based upon Defendant's request for continuance. 
9. Thirty-eight days of the 120-day disposition period expired between the date 
that the Defendant gave notice of his request for disposition, May 5, 2003, and 
the date of the first scheduled Preliminary Hearing, June 10, 2003. 
10. Thirty-three days of the 120-day disposition period expired between the date 
that the Defendant was bound over for trial, October 8, 2003, and the date of 
the first pretrial conference, November 10, 2003. 
11. As of the date of the Court's ruling in this matter, August 13, 2003, seventy-
one days of the 120-day disposition period have expired. Since the Court 
finds good cause, due to the Defendant's request for continuance, for delaying 
the trial in the case at bar until December 7, 8, and 9, 2004, the State will have 
forty-nine days from that date in which to bring the Defendant to trial. 
4 7LL\ 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court 
denies the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
DATED this ^ ' day of September, 2004. 
The Honorable William W. Barrett 
Third District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 
\ ^HftuJiJ XVcy/lD U&4OA) , hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
A-
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
O .c-As. 7fr-5 -lot- «£ 
Degree Punishment 
Mm/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory \ 
— = : 1-=. a s : he 
f^LOt^i 0-10,000 ftK*?+%S?t, 
l^rQeCdus C?- Lifer. p&&A) 
t?L&*i C>lf)OCV fMF+trl* 
~^r*J 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me, I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
JfHQXj^ k£*\M$T ~5 liJDlViDUAUS ID TUf? CoQ&€£? nt> 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no cpntest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which.I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest): 
O^ KP&O^ £, 2&Q^{ 4^lh^y\ 5 , l7#o to - no -gfci-r £^H^ CouAjry 
f)P 4 8 Perots ^ o a^ -TH& Cove^er Tllbejer&F TU££m&*j& 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights t s x 
I.am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that Ihave the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an -attorney will be appointed by thecourt at no cost to me. I understand 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I ^^^opXhave) waived my rights to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my rights to counsel, my attorney is 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
. Jury Trial I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an. impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, a ) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to. compel witnesses. Iknow that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if Ichose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those cost. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make-me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the juiy would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am. presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving 
each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to seicvmg 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved^ the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run' 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to.impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
"v*Ff 
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)/i^are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
~F> Iffiffly ^f S ^ ^ Y t^ THAT VtfF&K>Q*hJir If PUZZUIAJL LUS 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation, or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may dp are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to gtt me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am^J.years of age. I have attended school through, the U grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
5 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) beforesentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be.pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 
y/Uavru iT^U •/fy/ h (TWLUfa 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for. ^ H f t y J O l ^ v ^ p C^UO^S _ the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crhne(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, axe 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. J f e Z ^ b 
./I.I 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against. 
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant 
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is. true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage 
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of. defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance 




Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
cnme(s) set forth in this Statement be a b a t e d and entered. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Shawn David Larson 
Defendant. 
Minute Entry and Order 
Case No. 031902498 
Judge William W. Barrett 
Defendant filed a Motion For Reinstatement of Direct Appeal; Motion For Appointment 
of Counsel on November 8, 2005. These motions have a caption Shawn Larson v. Salt Lake 
County District Attorney. Mr. Larson did not provide a copy to the District Attorney. 
I have reviewed the file and it is clear that Defendant Larson did not file a Notice of 
Appeal. The filing of the motions in November 2005 are not timely in that the time for filing an 
appeal expired. Therefore, the motions are denied. This minute entry shall constitute the courts 
order. 
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2006 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Third Judicial District Court 
\JD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
DAVID E. YOCUM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
2001 South State Street, #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Inmate Shawn D. Larson, No. 25181 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2006 
Nancy Watkins 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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